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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001455

SIPDIS

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [MOPS](#) [EU](#) [CG](#)

SUBJECT: EU SECURITY MISSION REFORM REPORT

REF: KINSHASA 1447

Classified By: Ambassador Roger Meece. Reason 1.4 (b/d).

1.(U) The European Union Security Mission (EUSec) chief, General Joana, provided further details on the EUSec security sector reform report recently presented to the GDRC, as reported reftel. Joana briefed the 16 Ambassadors/Charges of the International Committee to Accompany the Transition (CIAT) during the CIAT,s regular weekly meeting September 8.

The Problem

2.(C) Joana outlined EUSec findings regarding the current administrative disarray of the FARDC. Highlights of the Mission,s findings include the following:

a) There is no accurate inventory of the total number of FARDC personnel, much less their deployments and movements. This applies to the "ex-government" forces as well as former "rebel" (i.e., MLC and RCD) units. Clearly no pay or support system can be effective without an established base line. The current South African-led military census project will take a major first step toward establishing this base, but the ID cards being issued under this process lack biometric indicators. Already, cases have been recorded of multiple registrations. Since the census is being conducted over several months, personnel transfers between units already inventoried and those not yet covered will likely introduce further errors into the recorded numbers.

b) There is in essence no remaining administrative cadre left within the FARDC. With administrative training and expertise neglected for years by Mobutu,s military, the problem has grown worse with the 1990,s cut-off of international training and support. At this point, there has been a gap of about 10 years without any administrative specialist training, and there is nobody left with administrative expertise.

c) The FARDC continues to make payments to disabled and de facto retired soldiers as well as to survivors (widows and children), because there are no viable systems in place to pick up defined state obligations to these individuals.

d) The pay/support system is basically an inheritance of the dysfunctional Mobutu-era system, with weaknesses magnified by years of war and instability. There is no legal statutory code defining pay, benefits, and responsibilities. Pay is handled by an ad hoc system, with individual units defining the next month,s cash needs. This information moves up the command chain, with cash eventually disbursed through the same chain. Inflated claims and corrupt skimming, and eventual near-total loss of control, are predictable results of such a system.

e) Procurement for food rations is similarly dysfunctional, with a supposedly centralized procurement system unable to provide sufficient supplies, and costs magnified by the need for expensive transport to widely dispersed military units. Corruption arising within the rather loosely controlled cash-based systems clearly creates further problems. Approximately \$2 million/month is now spent for food, but supplies are lacking throughout the country.

f) Pay levels are completely inadequate. The base enlisted pay of \$10/month is clearly insufficient to support a soldier, much less the soldier,s family. The lack of personnel control multiplies the problem. A transferred soldier, for example, may end up for months not appearing on anyone,s claimed payroll. Given the disarray in the system, this usually means no compensation for the lost time. Health and education services to which the uniformed military are in theory entitled, have eroded to such a point over the years that they essentially now do not exist.

g) Lodging is also nearly nonexistent or inadequate throughout the force, with large numbers of soldiers and families essentially without shelter.

3.(C) To begin to address these issues, EUSec has made numerous recommendations, the main elements of which are summarized below. Most will require international community support.

a) Create the statutes and regulations necessary to define military service pay, benefits, and related conditions.

b) Institute a follow-on ID exercise to the South African census project once completed, including biometric indicators to facilitate an accurate personnel data base and tracking system. EUSec noted the system being utilized by CONADER, the agency in charge of DDR programs, as appropriate and suitable for adaptation. This system includes iris scans, with information transferred to a central computerized data base. If not practical, other technologies, including fingerprint scans, could of course be considered.

c) Most critically, separate command and administrative/financial control functions. Pay requirements and disbursement responsibility should be taken away from line commanders and vested with separate administrative controllers. Pending training of skilled FARDC administrators, two international advisors should be assigned to each integrated brigade to assist with implementation of a reformed pay system.

d) International community-supported training should be provided on an urgent basis to develop administrative skills and expertise within the FARDC.

e) Payments to retired or disabled soldiers, as well as to widows and children survivors of deceased soldiers, should be taken off the Defense active-duty roster and transferred elsewhere. (Disabled or retired soldiers, for example, can be handled through the CONADER-managed DDR process.)

f) Develop systems to provide health and education services to military personnel and their dependents.

g) Provide for basic lodging and shelter for soldiers and their families.

h) Greatly step up international training efforts to increase the general professional military level of FARDC officers and troops. There has been essentially no international training for at least five years until very recently, and the negative effects of this suspension are clear.

i) Restore the FARDC,s own military schools.

4.(C) Neither Joana nor CIAT members harbor any illusions about the magnitude of these tasks. Clearly some are more urgently needed than others; i.e, ensuring basic adequate pay, food, and other support systems. The EU in particular is already devoting substantial resources to DRC military training, integration, and reform in general, and the general sense is that the EU commitment will continue as long as progress is being recorded.

5.(C) The EUSec report was presented to the GDRC Superior Defense Council the afternoon of September 7. The session apparently was long, extending into the evening, and we do not yet have a read-out of the results.

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